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Summary: We aim at questioning, within a political economy framework, the institutional context of environmental policies for the 
case of Turkey in general and of Istanbul in particular. The paper is centred around a survey study conducted with citizens of 
Istanbul (n=1565), a metropolitan city whose population is around 9 millions, with regard to their attitudes and behaviours on 
environmental issues, together with a set of in-depth interviews (n=16) carried out with representatives of business, NGOs, trade 
unions, and bureaucrats. The point of departure of the paper is the claim that environmental policies are likely to alter, overtly or 
covertly, the income distribution of societies, and ipso facto those who will be worse off in the ex-post sense will have a clear 
incentive to influence public authorities and politicians (be they central or local units) in not implementing them—their success 
depending of course on the extent to which the governing body is not sterile but open to corruption (the so-called “government 
failures”). The implication of the existence of such government failures on the enforceability of regulations dealing with 
environmental issues is certainly an area to which attention has recently been given, both at theoretical and empirical levels, 
where the issue of institutional context has emerged as one if not the important issue in addressing such failures. Turkey, being 
one of the clear examples of the existence of such corruptive elements, should certainly offer rich inputs to the said discussion, 
and the paper makes an attempt to questioning the institutional aspect of environmental policies from the point of view of citizens 
of Istanbul and of different stakeholders. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
The purpose of this chapter is to make a contribution to the analysis of environmental problems in Turkey 
from a political economy standpoint. The paper is centred around two sources of data. The first data source 
comes from a survey study conducted with citizens of Istanbul, a metropolitan city with a population of 9 
millions, and the second data source comprises a set of in-depth interviews carried out with representatives 
of business, NGOs, trade unions, and bureaucrats. The survey and in-depth interviews provided 
information with regard to their positions on environmental issues and their preferred institutional framework 
for regulation and environmental policies.   
Environmental degradation is known to be associated with overuse of natural resources and/or 
disposal of waste above the assimilative capacity of the ecosystem. The lack of well-defined property rights 
and the existence of market failures have typically been referred to in explaining the “economic rationale” of 
such problems (see, for a standard account, Pearce and Turner [1990]). It is also a well-established fact 
that a distorted wealth and income distribution coupled with the existence of a relatively high portion of 
society living under the poverty line would make environmental degradation more aggravated (see e.g. 
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Inglehart [1990, 1995]; Boyce [1994]; Brechin & Kempton [1994]; Duraiappah [1998]). Whatever the causes 
and the explanation of environmental problems, a “social-guardian” government, be it local or central, can 
take necessary actions to curb degradation, by inter alia assigning property rights on the use of natural 
resources, enforcing direct control over pollutants and devising incentive mechanisms to encourage the 
use of abatement facilities.  
Yet, capability does not always bring about implementation! One should also pay attention to the 
question of “[w]hether government activities are undertaken costlessly and selflessly by public servants 
who can omnisciently determine exactly what constitutes a socially optimum set of techniques and volumes 
of production of various goods and services” (Krueger [1994:422 et seq.]). As in most instances 
environmental policies would alter, in an implicit or explicit way, the income distribution of societies (see 
e.g. Boyce [1994]), those who will be worse off in the ex-post sense as a result of the implementation of a 
pro-environmentalist policy will have a clear incentive to bribe public authorities (be they central or local) 
not to implement them—their success depending of course on the extent to which politicians and civil 
servants are not “sterile” but open to corruption (thus the so-called “government failures”). The implication 
of the existence of such government failures with regard to the enforceability of regulations pertaining to 
environmental issues is certainly an area to which attention has recently been given, both at theoretical and 
empirical levels, where the issue of institutional context has emerged as one if not the important issue in 
addressing such failures (Baumol [1987]; North [1990]; Rose-Ackerman [1999]). Turkey, being one of the 
clear examples of the existence of such corruptive elements, may offer rich inputs to the said discussion, 
and the present paper makes an attempt to questioning the institutional aspect of environmental policies 
from the point of view of different stakeholders on environmental issues and the public at large.  
Turkey’s ever-increasing environmental problems, which have been escalated in the post-1970 era 
as a consequence of high rates of industrialisation, urbanisation and tourism activities that have not been 
properly planned and regulated, together with the widening gap of wealth and income distribution, have 
been of great magnitude. The main ones are: air pollution in most cities (especially in shanty towns) and 
industrial spots; household and industrial discharges polluting ground, thermal and mineral waters, rivers, 
lakes and coastal zones; discharges coupled with inappropriate use of fertilisers polluting the soil; heavy 
soil erosion in most parts of the country; early and excessive grazing as well as building and infrastructure 
construction threatening forests, pastures and grasslands; and noise pollution in most cities (see Türkiye 
Çevre Vakfı [1999]).  
This being said, however, even a quick glimpse will unveil that Turkey has a substantial body of 
legislation regarding environmental protection, with well-defined responsibilities and duties that are 
assigned to different public institutions (Yaşar [1999]; Adaman [1997]; Keleş and Hamamcı [1993]). Not 
only have environmental rights been clearly defined in the Constitution, but also public authorities have 
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been empowered within a well-constructed organizational and structural scheme to be able to deal with 
environmental issues.1 This paradoxical situation of having, on the one hand, a regulatory set-up and 
mandate and, on the other, an ongoing degratadion of nature thus needs an explanation: it goes without 
saying that either the government does not in fact consider environmental issues at its priority level (but at 
the same time does want to give itself a pro-environmentalist image), or a set of corruptive elements has 
been causing “government failures” in blocking the implementation of environmental rules—or both (for a 
detailed discussion, see Adaman [2002, 1997]). Whatever the reason(s), the legislative body as of today 
can by and large be categorised as not fully effective, to say the least. 
The existence of poverty in the country is clearly visible both in the shanty towns of major cities 
(Istanbul being a prime example), the occupants of which are mainly employed in the informal sector with 
low salaries and virtually no social protection, and in most rural areas, where land workers on average are 
reluctant to switch to environmentally-friendly but more costly technologies, must certainly be playing a role 
in the ongoing degradation (Adaman [2002]; Türkiye Çevre Vakfı [1999]; UNDP [1998]).2 When the poverty 
element is considered, the central government and local authorities may understandably find themselves 
inclined not to enforce tough environmental regulations, as this determination may well put some of the 
poor below the subsistence level.  
This noticed, however, recent studies have also indicated that corruptive actions are widespread in 
the country, thus forming “black holes” in the public arena (Transparency International [2002]; Adaman and 
Çarkoğlu [2000]; Adaman et al. [2001]).3 It is likely that of these black holes a portion is to do with 
environmental issues. A related issue is the erosion of people’ trust in public institutions. A lack of trust may 
be either because of insufficient competence on the part of public institutions, or because of the existence 
of corrupt activities, or both. In a recent survey on this topic conducted with 3021 households as 
representatives of the urban population of Turkey, Adaman et al. [2001:40-45] showed that households 
gave, on average, the scores of 3.9, 3.2, and 2.1 out of 10, where 10 was meant full trust and 0 no trust at 
all, in the central government, the Parliament, and the political parties, respectively (see also Adaman and 
Çarkoğlu [2000]; Esmer [1999]). The same survey also revealed that AKUT, the Rescue and Search Team, 
emerged as one of the most trusted institutions, along with the Armed Forces, scoring 7.6 and 7.7, 
respectively. It is telling that an NGO, which was originally established as a mountain rescue team but later 
                                                          
1 Cf. the Article 56 of the present Constitution: “Everyone has the right to live in an unpolluted environment, enjoy on an equal 
basis the beauty of nature. The state and citizens have both responsibility in preventing pollution and protecting as well as 
enriching the environment.” The formation of an undersecretariat of environment goes back to 1978--this body was then 
transformed in 1991 into the ministry of environment.  
2 Although the absolute poverty does not seem to be a major problem in Turkey (those getting 1USD or less per day is 2.5% of 
the population), relative poverty does indeed. The GINI index fluctuates around 45%, thus representing a rather unequally 
distributed income (DPT, 2001). 
3 According to Transparency International, Turkey’s corruption perception index is found to be 3.2 out of 10, where 10 means not 
corrupt at all and 0 totally corrupt, ranking her at 62nd out of 102 countries (Transparency International [2002]). 
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extended its activities to cover natural disasters as well and subsequently conducted many monumental 
operations after the devastating August 1999 earthquake, could get the trust of the public at large. Another 
noteworthy outcome is the trust felt in municipalities. Here, the urban population gave a trust score of 4.4, 
which is just below the midpoint of 5 but certainly above the scores for the Parliament and the central 
government. 
As important as the institutional framework are individuals’ concerns, attitudes and behaviours 
towards environmental protection. To what degree are individuals concerned with environmental problems? 
Do they make a differentiation between local and global environmental problems? To what extent do they 
act in an environmentally-friendly way? Are they politically active in relation to environmental issues? Are 
they fully committed to the environmental cause? Are they ready to make sacrifice, if necessary? These 
and other related questions are of course crucially important in understanding individuals’ positions vis-à-
vis environmental issues. Needless to say, the personal attributes and the “rules of the game” should be 
treated as being in interaction with each other. On the one hand, the rules have an impact over individuals’ 
positions and, on the other, individuals have a right and power to alter the institutional framework. The 
exploration of this junction constitutes the centre of gravity of this paper.   
To achieve our aim we draw on two sources of data. The first is a survey study (with a total of 1565 
interviews) that we conducted in Istanbul (in December 1998)—a large metropolitan city in a developing 
country—intended to draw out the concerns, attitudes, political activism, and commitment of the citizens of 
Istanbul on environmental issues. Special attention was paid to the commitment dimension through asking 
our respondents to reveal their willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental improvement. WTP is thus used 
as a proxy for commitment, for reasons to be explored later. Furthermore, in order to address the issue of 
the distinction between local versus national versus global environmental issues, sea pollution (the 
Bosphorus) in Istanbul, soil erosion in Turkey, and ozone depletion were chosen as three separate 
environmental issues to be valued. Finally, respondents were also asked to reveal their choices regarding 
the institutional body that they think should be responsible in implementing the improvement project of the 
three environment issues. 
The second source is information gathered from a set of in-depth interviews (n=16), conducted 
between February and March 1998 with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central government 
authorities, and labour unions, which were aimed at eliciting different stakeholders’ positions on environmental 
issues. The interviews also probed respondents’ positions on possible actions that can be taken at 
local/national/global levels with regard to environmental protection and their reactions to the possibility of 
forming a co-ordinating agency to seek and sustain a consensus among different interest groups on 
environmental issues. 
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In what follows we first present and analyse the results of the quantitative survey and then present and 
evaluate the in-depth interviews. On the basis of these evaluations we provide a better picture of the political 
economy of the environment in Istanbul and make suggestions in improving the preservation of the nature. We 
also suggest some new areas of research.  
 
 
2a. RESULTS: QUANTITATIVE STUDY 
Sample 
The questionnaire of our study was administered (between 10-31 December 1998) to a total of 1565 
households drawn from metropolitan Istanbul (by using a clustered random sample).4 First, 125 districts 
were drawn from a total of 567 districts (with probabilities proportionate to their population counts); second, 
in each district 4 blocks were selected randomly; finally, three households were chosen in each block using 
a table of random numbers.5 All households were asked questions on general environmental issues (viz. 
concern, attitudes, and political activism) and on demographic characteristics. Concerning the questions on 
commitment (WTP), the total sample was divided into three, with a view to extracting people’s willingness 
to make sacrifice in monetary terms for three different environmental issues. Each household in a block 
was assigned a version that involved a different environmental issue to be considered, which assured that 
there were three sub-samples, one for sea pollution in Istanbul (n=524), one for soil erosion in Turkey 
(n=524), and one for global ozone depletion (n=517), each roughly of equal size. As already mentioned, 
sea pollution (Bosphorus) in Istanbul was chosen as the local environmental problem to be valued, a 
concrete environmental issue for the citizens of Istanbul; the soil erosion, which is not particularly a 
problem for Istanbul but a major environmental issue at the national level, was chosen as the national 
environmental problem; finally, ozone depletion was chosen as the global environmental issue to be 
valued. The ex-post statistical analysis revealed that the three sub-groups are not statistically different from 
each other in terms of demographic characteristics.  
 
Measures 
Environmental Concern: The question that probed environmental concern and awareness listed a total of 
15 different environmental problems, and respondents were asked to report their degree of concern for 
each problem. The possible answers consisted of “not concerned”, “somewhat concerned”, “much 
concerned” and “never heard”. The percentages of “much concerned” together with “never heard” are 
                                                          
4 Main characteristics of our sample are as follows: 55.1% are female; the mean age is 37.9; 67.4% are born in Istanbul; the 
mean education is 8 years 3 months; the average household size is 4.6. 
5 Lists of voter registration that were constructed for the 1995 parliamentary elections were taken as the base for the sampling, 
according to which population above 18 years of age was known as 4,869,598.  
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provided in Table 1. “Never heard” category was used so as to tap awareness rather than knowledge. 
Respondents were not asked to describe the probed environmental problems; as such, this study has not 
attempted to tackle the problematic concept of “environmental knowledge”. Knowledge of the environment 
is not a unidimensional concept; besides mere awareness, it involves detailed information (educated 
information) about several environmental problems and heir consequences. Moreover, knowledge is highly 
interdependent with concern: knowing something about an environmental issue leads to concern tha in turn 
leads to further learning about the environment (Arcury [1990]). The discussion on the nature of 
environmental knowledge is beyond the scope of this paper.  
As Table 1 makes clear, people in Istanbul seem to be much concerned with not all but most 
environmental problems. These figures are in conformity with the earlier work that was conducted by 
Dunlap et al. (1993).6 For the use in statistical estimations, however, instead of taking these 15 items 
separately, we have constructed a 0-1 point scale through a factor analysis, whose loadings were used as 
the variable of environmental concern. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
A telling initial observation is that awareness drops when the issues of tropical deforestation, acid rain, and 
global warming and greenhouse effect are questioned. More specifically, one notices that more than a 
quarter of our sample have indicated that they had not heard of problems of global warming and 
greenhouse effect, despite their being under media coverage for some time. This indicates that a group of 
citizens of Istanbul are not aware of some of the surrounding environmental problems. The lack of 
awareness of environmental issues was tested further. Despite the fact that the impact of NGOs in the 
environmental political arena in Turkey can by no means be categorised as marginal, of our sample close 
to three fifth (58%) were unable to spell out correctly the name of at least one of such organisations.   
 
Attitudes: Expressing concern is one thing, showing an attitude that can be defined as pro-environmentalist 
is another. To unravel this, respondents were asked to indicate their attitudes towards a list of four pro-
environmentalist actions with regard to their daily behaviour: (1) To carry out litter for themselves if no litter 
bins are available nearby; (2) To put aside glasses, plastics and metals from the rest of the garbage for 
recycling purposes; (3) To put aside newspapers and other papers from the rest of the garbage for 
                                                          
6 When a factor analysis is conducted, air pollution, soil pollution, sea pollution, soil erosion and solid waste (garbage) turn out to 
constitute one group (that can be labeled as ‘local environmental concern’), whereas global warming and green house effect, 
tropical deforestation, ozone depletion, acid rain, nuclear waste and extinction of species turn out to constitute another group 
(that can be labeled as ‘global environmental concern’). Further analyses indicate that the mean of the local concern is 
statistically higher than that of the global one. (For details, see Gökşen et al. [2002].) 
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recycling purposes; (4) To bring along their own bag while shopping. All such activities require a personal 
cost, however minimal in some cases, and their return is very seldom personal gain (e.g., it is extremely 
rare in Istanbul that you will be charged for the plastic bag to be supplied by the shop, or that you will be 
fined for throwing away your litter). Hence, an affirmative answer can be understood as a pro-
environmentalist action. The results are tabulated in Table 2. For use in statistical computations, however, 
the following recording was designed: The one who indicated “always” or “sometimes” for an item was 
given a score of 1, and “never” a score of 0. As such, the maximum score one respondent can take 
appears as 4 (if s/he replies “always” or “sometimes” to all the four questions) and the minimum one as 0 (if 
s/he replies “never” to all the four questions). Further computations reveal that of our population 14% have 
scored 4, while 4% have scored 0, and the rest getting scores in between 0 and 4 (exclusive). 
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Political Activism on Environment: To have a pro-environmentalist attitude in daily life is certainly an 
important demarcation line, but to be politically active in the fight against the degradation of nature is yet 
another dimension, especially when one acknowledges the well-known collective action problems (Olson 
[1965]). To probe this dimension, respondents were asked to report whether or not they undertook a 
political action on the issue of environmental protection in the form of participating in a campaign, of writing 
a letter of concern to an official institution, and of informing the media on environmental issues. The results 
are presented in Table 3. For the use in statistical computations the following recording was devised: 
Those who gave a No answer to all the three questions were coded as “not active”, while those who gave 
one Yes answer or more were coded as “active”. According to this criterion, 14% of our population are 
categorised as politically active group.   
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Willingness-to-pay in Conjunction with Bosphorus Pollution/Soil Erosion/Ozone Depletion Problems: The 
survey study aimed at capturing the intensity of commitment towards environment protection by asking 
about people’s WTP for specific improvements of well-defined environmental problems of Bosphorus 
pollution/soil erosion/ozone depletion. As such, the WTP method was employed as an indicator of attitude 
strength regarding environmental improvement. And the “contingent valuation” technique was used to 
reveal that information. The contingent valuation module started with a detailed description of the 
environmental problem included in the version (Bosphorus pollution/soil erosion/ozone depletion) that was 
assigned to the respondent. In each case verbal information was complemented with visual information in 
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the form of figures and charts. The description of the problem was followed by the description of a project, 
which, if adopted, would bring about well-defined improvement in the quality of the environmental good 
under consideration. The willingness to pay question used, following Carson et al. [1992], a binary discrete-
choice referendum elicitation format, asking whether the respondent would approve (vote for) the proposed 
project that would solve the problem at hand if it cost a specified amount that would be paid by their 
household (as a one-time payment).7 In order to cover a wide range of possible willingness to pay amounts, 
four different versions, each with a different starting Turkish Lira amount as the first take-it-or-leave-it 
amount, were used for each of the three environmental scenarios. Before asking the willingness to pay 
questions, the respondents were reminded that it was equally socially acceptable to be against the 
implementation of the proposed project or not to agree to pay anything towards the program.  
The construction of the willingness to pay variable was carried out as follows: The willingness to 
pay for each respondent was identified as the minimum amount the respondent has expressed willingness 
to pay for by saying “Yes” to that amount. The binary discrete-choice referendum elicitation format gave for 
each respondent an interval within which his or her true willingness to pay lay. The estimate we arrive at by 
using the lower bound of this interval is therefore a very conservative estimate for true willingness to pay. 
The average figures for the three different environmental projects are presented in Table 4. Note that 
respondents are willing to pay lesser amounts as we move from the local environmental problem to 
national and global environmental problems; however, the pair-wise differences between the means are not 
statistically significant.8 In our statistical analyses we also used the combined WTP figures.  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
We were also interested in people’s explanation for refusing to make any contributions. Note that half of the 
sample (780 out of 1565) has in fact indicated that they would not make the contribution that was asked for. 
Thus, we asked those who refused to make the announced contribution to reveal their reasons for their 
choice (Table 5). The first noteworthy observation is that the shares of not making a contribution are very 
close for all the three cases (252, 259 and 269 cases were reported for Bosphorus, erosion, and ozone, 
respectively, corresponding to 48, 49 and 52 percentages of the three subsamples). This being noted, we 
then observe that an overwhelming majority (around three quarters) of the respondents across the three 
                                                          
7 This type of question, also called as a take-it-or-leave-it question, requests the respondent give a yes-or-no response to a 
specific cost. Each respondent was then administered a double-bounded dichotomous choice question where the respondent 
was asked to give a yes-or-no response to a second pre-specified higher amount if the response to the initial take-it-or-leave-it 
question is “Yes” and to a pre-specified lower amount if the initial response is “No”. A one-time single payment was chosen as 
the payment vehicle. For a detailed description of the approach used, see Zenginobuz et al. [2000] and Gökşen et al. [2002]. 
8 Recall that the WTP variable was constructed using the minimum amount the respondent has expressed willingness to pay for 
by saying “Yes” to that amount (see the previous footnote). So the mean estimates presented in Table 4 are rather conservative.  
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cases who refused to pay showed their insufficient financial means as the reason for not accepting to pay 
the announced amount for the environmental improvement. Care should also be given to the fact that 
around 15% of those who refused to pay in all the three cases expressed concern with regard to the 
success of the projects, which comes to mean that of our sample around 8% (118 out of 1565) indicated 
that they were not convinced to the workability of the scenarios. More “convincing” scenarios could have 
therefore played a role of shifting these people from refusals to contributors. In the same vein, 25 persons 
(accounting for the 2% of our sample) who refused to pay revealed that they have no trust that the 
collected money will be used for environmental purposes. Similarly, one may speculate that should it be 
possible to increase these people’s trust with regard to the use of the to-be-collected money, then one may 
expect to have their financial contributions. A final worthy observation is the existence of 45 people 
(accounting for the 3% of our sample), who in fact protested to the whole idea of asking voluntary 
contributions on the basis that others and not themselves were responsible of these environmental 
problems (their relative share increasing for the case of Bosphorus might at least be partially explained by 
the fact that, as two major tanker accidents had occurred on Bosphorus in the last 25 years, people were 
more ready to associate sea pollution with industry).  
 
[Insert Table 4] 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
Preferred Institutional Body Responsible for Implementing the Three Environment Projects: The next 
question put forward to those who accepted to make a contribution, that which institutional body—among 
the choice set of the Parliament, the government, the municipality, NGOs, and the United Nations—should 
be given the task of implementing the improvement project, reveals important information. Table 6 provides 
the results for the three cases. The choice among a set of five institutions (the “other” option was also given 
to check whether any institution was left outside the given options, but it turned out that suggested names 
other than the five were of minimal importance) should reflect citizens’ views with regard to the capability of 
an institution to implement a specific environmental improvement (thus the perceived competence of an 
institution) together with the trust felt towards an institution in not misbehaving (e.g. acting in a corrupt 
way). As the table makes clear, close to half of our sample indicated that NGOs should take the 
responsibility, and approximately one fifth went for the municipality option. Note that the support given to 
municipality gets its highest value of 26.5% in the case of Bosphorus and its lowest value of 17.7% in the 
ozone problem. The Parliament and the government each received just a bit higher than a ten percent 
support. The United Nations option got a support of an around six percent for the cases of Bosphorus and 
erosion, climbing to twelve percent when the ozone issue is at hand.   
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[Insert Table 6] 
 
Analysis 
This section will provide three sets of analyses with regard to our measurements. The first set consists of 
investigating the possible connections between our measurements. The second searches for the 
determinants of our measurements among a set of independent variables. The third focuses on the 
determinants of the choice of institutions in charge of implementing the environment projects.  
Correlation Matrix: In Table 7 we present Pearson correlation coefficients with the aim of understanding 
whether or not our measurements presented above are correlated with each other. The matrix indicates 
that although there is a statistically significant positive correlation between concern and attitude, concern 
and political activism, concern and WTP, attitude and political activism, and political activism and WTP, the 
degree of correlation in all cases is very close to zero. The matrix therefore suggests that environmental 
concern, pro-environmentalist attitude, political activism towards environmental protection, and material 
commitment represent different dimensions, despite being very loosely correlated with each other.  
 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Determinants of Dependent Variables: The second set of analysis is concerned with searching the 
determinants of the dependent variables. Towards that aim the following independent variables have been 
selected/constructed: Age: This variable represents the age of the respondent, and it is categorised as 18-
30, 31-45, and 46-81. The age distribution of our sample according to this categorisation is 39.4%, 33.5%, 
and 27.1%, respectively. Gender: This variable indicates the gender of the respondent. 55.1% of our 
sample are women and 44.9% men. Education: The question tapping education asked the degree that the 
respondent has from a formal education program, and it is categorised as illiterate and primary school with 
no degree, primary school (five years), secondary school (three/four years), high school (three years), and 
university and higher (four and more years) degrees. The education distribution of our sample according to 
this categorisation is 7.7%, 36.7%, 13.4%, 29.3, and 13.0%, respectively. The mean education was found 
to be 8.3 years. Material Security: Factor analysis was performed on occupation rankings, per capita 
consumption (monthly expenditure divided by household size), and the summative scale of household 
belongings (see Table 8). Factor loadings of the analysis were saved as the variable of material security 
and then these were coded as low, middle, and high, corresponding to 13.1%, 70.1%, and 16.8% of our 
population, respectively. Urbanity: the Urbanity measure was computed from the variables of place of birth 
(metropolitan, city, town, and village) and the number of years lived in Istanbul weighted by age. If the 
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respondents were born either in the metropolitan area or city and lived at least 50% of their life in Istanbul, 
it was coded as urban, otherwise as rural. 40.1% of our sample happen to be rural, and the remaining 
59.9% urban. 
The summary of econometric analyses aiming at finding out the determinants of our dependent 
variables is given in Table 9.9 The results indicate that increased age has a positive effect on environmental 
attitudes and political activism; being woman increases environmental concern and attitudes, whereas 
being man makes someone politically more pro-environmentalist; increased education turns out to have a 
positive impact over all the dependent variables; more material security means more environmental 
concern, higher political activity and more WTP; urbanity, finally, turns out to increase one’s environmental 
concern and attitudes. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Determinants of the Choice of Institutions: Finally, regarding the determinants of the choice of institutions, a 
multinominal regression analysis has been conducted with the same set of independent variables that have 
been used so far, the summary results of which are given in Table 10 (note that the reference institution is 
the UN). The results reveal that as education goes down, more responsibility is attributed to the Parliament, 
the government and the municipalities. Age is also found to have an impact over the choice of institutions; 
being young is associated with a more positive attitude towards the Parliament, municipalities and NGOs. It 
is also interesting to note that material security is not found to form a statistically significant dimension in 
the choice of institutions.  
[Insert Table 10] 
 
2b. RESULTS: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
A set of in-depth interviews (n=16) were conducted with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central 
government authorities, and labour unions, with a view to eliciting more specific attitudes, concerns, priorities 
and perceptions about improving environmental quality.10 Information sought probed, among other things, their 
                                                          
9 For the Political Activism variable the logistic technique has been used, for the remaining ones the OLS technique has been 
applied. Detailed econometric results can be obtained from the corresponding author. 
10 The in-depth interviews were conducted with the following persons, to whom the research team would like to express their 
gratitude: Ahmet Asena (director of the division of education, Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions of Turkey [DİSK]), 
Mustafa Beken (member of the executive board, Association of Independent Industrialists and Business Persons [MÜSİAD]), Nejat 
Büyükköksal (director of the office of environmental protection, Municipality of Beşiktaş [a main commercial district of the city with 
a population of approximately 220,000]), Korhan Gümüş (director, Association for Human Settlement), Memduh Hacıoğlu 
(industrialist, former president of Istanbul Chamber of Industry), Selçuk Tayfun Ok (director of the research department, Istanbul 
Chamber of Trade), Mustafa Öztürk (head of the office of environmental protection, Municipality of Greater Metropolitan Istanbul), 
Ruhi Paker (former vice governor of Istanbul), Haluk Tükel, Ümit İzmen and Umut Ergezer (secretary general, assistant to the 
secretary general and specialist assistant, respectively, of Association of Industrialists and Business Persons of Turkey [TÜSİAD]), 
Halil Ünlü, Nurdan Sirman and Neşe Eriş (members of the environment unit, Istanbul Chamber of Industry), Nergiz Yazgan and 
Selen Akhuy (director general and director of projects, respectively, of Association for the Preservation of Natural Life [DHKD]). 
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positions on possible environmental actions to be taken and their reactions to the possibility of forming a co-
ordinating agency to seek and sustain a consensus among different interest groups on environmental issues. 
All interviews were conducted before the household survey, between February and March 1998. 
To start with, all the interviewees agreed that environmental degradation was of great magnitude in 
Turkey, almost all referring—with different accentuation—to problems associated with pollution and overuse of 
natural resources. Similarly, they tended to agree that not much action had been taken so far in dealing with 
the ongoing degradation, and that there was not much optimism for the future in terms of improving 
environmental conditions unless radical measures were undertaken. But when two interrelated questions were 
raised regarding (i) what are the reasons for the failure of regulating the economic and social aspects of life 
with the aim of protecting the environment, and (ii) what needs to be done to change the failure story into a 
success one, positions differed a great deal.  
Regarding the reasons for failure, interviewees from the central and local governments put 
emphasis on the lack of effectiveness and the remaining ambiguities in the existing legislation, especially 
underlining the fact that the responsibilities between municipalities and representative institutions of the 
central government were not always clearly defined. But both also pointed out that if they wanted to fully 
apply the legislation, via resolving or bypassing these imperfect points, they would have faced much 
resistance from diverse sources. In this regard, four main headings were mentioned for the case of 
Istanbul: First, the existence of a large informal sector, bringing about the difficulty of control over mostly 
small/medium-sized ateliers that have been practically impossible to regulate; second, the continued 
increase of demand for new building, most but not all derived by immigration to the city of Istanbul; third, 
the lack of funds to be able to undertake large projects, as in the case of a complete solution to the sewage 
system, that would render the city more environmentally friendly; and fourth, the political interference in 
terms of demands to favour some specific groups. NGO representatives, on the other hand, pinpointed the 
rent-seeking activities that translate themselves into patronage networks as the main source of continued 
degradation as well as the absence of civil engagement in political decision-making processes. They 
stressed that lack of people’s participation should be seen as the main reason for the existence of 
corruptive activities that had roots in governments, be they local or central. Industry representatives mainly 
blamed national poverty, i.e. the level of development, or rather underdevelopment, as the main reason for 
environmental degradation. They claimed that the existence of a large informal sector in Istanbul, as the 
main source of industrial pollution, had to be accepted as a realpolitik, otherwise the major industries would 
not be able to compete in international markets and unemployment would rise drastically. Finally, a 
representative of one of the main labour unions made it clear that they directed their attention towards 
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pollution within firms that could have implications for their members’ health and that they approached the 
issue of environmentalism mainly within the “capital-labour” relationship.  
When the issue of “what is to be done” is raised, the representatives of the central and local 
governments demanded modifications to existing legislation, making it more effective in terms of procedure 
and incentive structure. They also underlined that fighting corruption should be equally important and 
therefore be incorporated in the environmental legislation, under the assumption that there would always 
be a core of bureaucrats ready to implement the legislation. NGO representatives placed emphasis on the 
transformative dynamics of civil engagement and also underlined that rent-seeking activities, motives 
behind corruption, could only be stopped through wider participation of interested parties with a stake. The 
industry representatives were rather optimistic on the grounds that at a higher industrialisation phase the 
informal sector would dissolve, thus reducing pollution at a greater rate. They added that the trend in 
international markets was moving towards environmentally-friendly processes and goods, and therefore the 
industry in Istanbul, largely under the pressure of international competition, would stick to that trend. They 
also noted that, to the extent that a local demand for environmentally-friendly produced goods arose, then 
production would inevitably follow this demand—further increasing the environmental sensitivity of the 
industry. They finally insisted that consensus-building should be tried in the environmental policy arena, as 
co-operation turned out to be a driving force in implementing projects that would have different impacts on 
different parties. Finally, the representative of the labour union indicated that unless the power relation of 
the whole society was redefined, environmental degradation that was present within and outside production 
units could not be stopped.  
 
3. DISCUSSION and CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The results obtained from both qualitative and quantitative interviews, confirming and to some extent 
complementing each other, indicate a set of realities that certainly need to be taken into account in any 
attempt to reconsider the ongoing environmental degradation in Turkey. We have four main interrelated 
results from the survey study that represents citizens of Istanbul. The first conclusion is that, faced with 
ongoing environmental degradation, people in Istanbul in general do not seem to be desperate in 
demanding urgent and radical actions towards protecting the environment, despite the fact that there is a 
great concern for environmental problems, when other pressing issues are present. This also reflects itself, 
as a second conclusion, into the figures of willingness to pay: when the issues of local, national and global 
environmental issues are presented, people seem to be ready to commit themselves in so far as their 
financial constraints do not bind—a constraint that seems to be effective for many who choose not to make 
any contribution. Furthermore, as a third conclusion, of those who contribute, a clear distinction towards 
committing money to three distinct environmental items cannot be found, suggesting that, if ready to 
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contribute, people do so without much considering whether the item in question has a local, national or 
global character. A fourth conclusion is the insistence of a large body of people that the implementing body 
should be neither the Parliament nor the government, but NGOs and to some extent municipalities (and in 
one case the UN). These outcomes seem to be in conformity with the trust scores that were mentioned at 
the Introduction; lack of trust to the Ankara government expressed itself in our results as well. Finally, 
econometric analyses suggested that increased education and material security would make people more 
concerned and more committed when the issue at hand is the environment. This last finding could also be 
read as a reform suggestion: reducing the number of those living around or under the poverty line and 
increasing education opportunities would help to reduce environmental degradation. 
Similar and complementary insights were obtained from the in-depth interviews that were 
conducted with representatives of industry, NGO’s, local and central government authorities, and labour 
unions, in that there seems to be an acknowledgement, perhaps with different accentuation, that the present 
legislative system on environmental protection is to a greater extent non-functional in dealing with the ongoing 
degradation mainly because of the existence of corruptive elements. To be able to deal with the patron-client 
type networks that basically disable this legislative body, emphasis was given, again with different 
accentuation, to reforming the existing legislation and to demanding more civil engagement. Finally, the in-
depth interviews unanimously indicated that combating poverty should be targeted in tackling environmental 
issues. 
 
Many have persistently argued that civil engagement alone, generally speaking, plays a role of resistance or 
opposition with much success, but when the issue of creating an alternative program is at hand civil 
engagement’s success stories are not so rich, and have added that success is usually tied to the existence of 
an alliance between state (central and local) actors and social movement (see e.g. Held [1987]). The 
conclusion to be drawn therefore is that if central/local governments and social groups manage to avoid 
traditional patterns of co-optation and confrontation in policy making, the end result would be beneficiary to all 
parties (see Lemos [1998] for such a success story in Brazil). The results that were presented for the case of 
Istanbul may play a starting point to form the framework of such an alliance. One remark in-passing might be 
relevant, however, in that, when referring to stakeholders’ participation, this should not be read as an easy 
and straightforward process; there are various ways and formats through which different stakeholders may 
come together, and the appropriate mechanism(s) may not always be easy to establish. The discussion on 
these different forms of participation with specific reference to Turkey does not seem to be abundant either 
(see, however, Belge and Bilgit [1997]; Adaman et al. [2002]). 
The results of this paper should be understood as being a first-round proposal; further studies need to 
be conducted in analysing the possible ways and organisational settings that would create the much-needed 
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alliances to combat pollution and depletion. Here, attention should also be given to one of the findings of this 
research that people at large do differentiate the institutional context of undertaking environmental policies for 
local/national/global problems. A framework that will prove to be successful in combating one issue may not be 
so in combating another one. And finally, recalling that the study, both the quantitative and qualitative ones, 
indicated that investing on education and combating poverty would have a positive effect on environmental 
preservation, much attention should be given on the interdependency of poverty and environment for the 
specific case of Turkey. 
  
 16
REFERENCES   
 
Adaman, Fikret (1997). The political economy of the environment in Turkey. New Perspectives in 
Turkey, Fall 17, 129-150. 
 
Adaman, Fikret and Ali Çarkoğlu (2000). Türkiye’de Yerel ve Merkezi Yönetimlerde Hizmetlerden 
Tatmin, Patronaj İlişkileri ve Reform. TESEV, Istanbul. 
 
Adaman, Fikret, Ali Çarkoğlu and Burhan Şenatalar (2001). Hanehalkı Gözünden Türkiye’de 
Yolsuzluğun Nedenleri ve Önlenmesine İlişkin Öneriler, Tesev, Istanbul. 
 
Adaman, Fikret, Sina Mandalinci and Yahya Madra (2002). The prospects of co-determination: The 
textile industry in Turkey. in F. Adaman and P. Devine (eds), Reciprocity, Redistribution and Exchange 
Revisited, Blackrose, Montreal. 
 
Arcury, T.A. (1990). Environmental attitudes and environmental knowledge. Human Organization, 
44, 300-304. 
 
Belge, Taciser and Orhan Bilgit (eds) (1997). Yurttaş Katılımı: Sivil Toplum Kuruluşları ve Yerel 
Yönetimler Arasında Ortaklık ve İşbirliği. Burfaş, Bursa. 
 
Boyce, James K. (1994). Inequality as a cause of environmental degradation. Ecological 
Economics, 11, 169-178. 
 
Brechin, Steven R. and Willett Kempton (1994). Global environmentalism: A challenge to the 
postmaterialism thesis, Social Science Quarterly, 51, 121-137. 
 
Carson, Richard T., Robert C. Mitchell, W. Michael Hanemann, Raymond J. Kopp, Stanley 
Presser, and Paul A. Ruud (1992). A contingent valuation study of lost passive use values resulting from 
the exxon valdez oil spill. A report to the Attorney General of the State of Alaska (November 19, 1992). 
 
DPT (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı) (2001), Gelir Dağılımının İyileştirilmesi ve Yoksullukla Mücadele 
(Improving the Income Distribution and Poverty Eradication), Ankara. 
 
Dunlap, Riley E., George H. Gallup and Alec M. Gallup (1993). Of global concern: Results of the 
Health of the Planet Survey. Environment, 35, 33-39. 
 
Duraiappah, Anantha K. (1998). Poverty and environmental degradation: A review and analysis of 
the nexus. World Development, 26(12), 2169-2179. 
 
Esmer, Yılmaz (1999). Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye’de Sosyal, Siyasal, Ekonomik Değerler. 
TESEV, Istanbul. 
 
Gökşen, Fatoş, Fikret Adaman and E. Ünal Zenginobuz (2002). On environmental concern, 
willingness to pay, and postmaterialist values: Evidence from Istanbul. Environment and Behavior. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald (1977). The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among 
Western Publics. Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
 
 17
Inglehart, Ronald (1990). Cultural Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton. 
 
Inglehart, Ronald (1995). Public support for environmental protection: Objective problems and 
subjective values in 43 societies. Political Science and Politics, 28, 57-72. 
 
Keleş, Ruhşen and C. Hamamcı (1993). Çevrebilim. İmge, Ankara. 
 
Krueger, O. Anne (1994). Economists’ changing perceptions of government. Weltwirtschaftliche 
Archive, 127, 417-431. 
 
Lemos, Maria C. (1998). The politics of pollution control in Brazil: State actors and social 
movements cleaning up Cubatão. World Development, 26(1), 75-87. 
 
Michener, Victoria J. (1998). The participatory approach: Contradiction and Co-option in Burkina 
Faso. World Development, 26(12), 2105-2118. 
 
North, Douglass (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
  
Olson, Mancur (1965). The Logic of Collective Action. Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
 
Pearce, David W. and Kerry R. Turner (1990). Economics of Natural Resources and the 
Environment. Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Rose-Ackerman, Susan (1999). Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and 
Reform.Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
 
 Türkiye Çevre Vakfı (1999). Türkiyenin Çevre Sorunları. Ankara, Türkiye Çevre Vakfı. 
 
UNDP: Insani Gelişme Raporu (1998). Ankara, UNDP. 
 
Yaşamış, Firuz D. (1999). Turkish Environmental Law: an overview of legal principles. Mimeo. 
 
Zenginobuz, E. Ünal, Fikret Adaman and Fatoş Gökşen (2000). Local vs. national vs. global 
environmental goods: Does it make any difference in terms of willingness to pay?—Evidence from a 




Table 1. Perceived Seriousness of Specific Environmental Problems (n=1565) 
 
Environmental issues Much Concerned 
(%) 
Never Heard (%) 
Deforestation 92.6 0.8 
Sea pollution 84.3 1.2 
Industrial waste 80.9 1.7 
Solid waste (garbage) 79.6 0.8 
Extinction of species 76.7 2.1 
Water pollution 75.4 0.2 
Air pollution 72.5 0.3 
Soil erosion 68.8 5.6 
Ozone depletion 68.4 8.9 
Nuclear waste 67.6 7.7 
Noise pollution 64.2 3.0 
Tropical deforestation 53.6 15.5 
Acid rains 49.8 20.8 
Soil pollution 45.2 10.2 
Global warming and greenhouse effect 31.4 26.2 
 
 
Table 2. Environmental Attitudes in Daily Life (n=1565) 
 






To carry out litter with themselves if no litter bins are available nearby 8.4 19.6 71.8 
To put aside glasses, plastics and metals from the rest of the garbage for 
recycling 
54.9 21.1 22.7 
To put aside newspapers and other papers from the rest of the garbage for 
recycling 
46.6 17.0 35.6 




Table 3. Political Action (n=1565) 
 
Political Action Yes (%) No (%) 
To be a member of an environmentalist NGO or active in an environmentalist campaign 
(in the last 2 years) 
4.1 95.9 
To make an inquiry on environmental protection to an official institution 9.2 90.8 





Table 4. Mean WTP for Environmental Issues 
(n=524+524+517=1565) 
 
 N Mean 
(Million TL) 
Sea Pollution (Bosphorus) in Istanbul (Local Issue) 524 10.53  
Soil Erosion (National Issue) 524 9.86  
Ozone Depletion (Global Issue) 517 9.51  
 




Table 5. Reasons given for not Contributing (n=780; percentages in parantheses) 
 
 Bosphorus  Erosion Ozone WTP 
combined 
Cannot afford 175 (70%) 195 (75%) 203 (75%) 573 (73%) 
No faith to the success of the project 38 (15%) 38 (15%) 42 (16%) 118 (15%) 
I’m not responsible—the responsible should pay 23 (9%) 11 (4%) 11 (4%) 45 (6%) 
Collected money will not be used for this purpose 13 (5%)  10 (4%) 2 (1%) 25 (3%) 
Not a big issue 1 (1%) 2 (1%) 7 (3%) 10 (1%) 
Other 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 4 (1%) 9 (1%) 
Total 252 (100%) 259 (100%) 269 (100%) 780 (100%) 
 
 
Table 6. Choice of Institutions to be in Charge in Implementing the Project (%) 
 
 Bosphorus Erosion Ozone WTP 
combined 
Parliament 12.8 10.0 11.3 11.4 
Government 13.2 12.8 12.1 12.7 
Municipalities 26.5 22.0 17.7 22.3 
Environmental NGOs 38.1 47.6 42.9 42.6 
United Nations 6.6 5.6 12.1 7.5 




Table 7. Pearson Correlation Matrix of Dependent Variables 
 
 Concern Attitudes Political 
activism 
WTP 
Concern X 0.132** 0.133** 0.068** 
Attitudes 0.132** X 0.131** 0.03 
Political activism 0.133** 0.131** X 0.081** 
WTP 0.068** 0.03 0.081** X 
 **Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Table 8. Scales and Individual Items Used to Construct Scales 
 
Scale Items 
URBANITY - Where were you born? (metropolitan, city, town, village) - How long have you been living in Istanbul? (weighted by age) 




Composite measure of: 
- Occupation 
- Per capita consumption 
- Household belongings   
PER CAPITA 
CONSUMPTION 
- Approximately how much do you spend for expenditures in a 
month? 
- Including yourself, how many people live in your household? 
OCCUPATION What is your occupation? What kind of work do you do? Explain in details. (Categories below were created after the examination of the 






- Small-to-medium size business 










- Cellular phone 





Table 9. Determinants of Dependent Variables 
 
 
 Concern Attitudes Political 
activism 
WTP 
Age   Old** Old*  
Gender Women** Women** Men**   
Education +** +** +* +** 
Material Security +*  +** +** 
Urbanity +** +**   
**Significant at 0.01 level. 






Table 10. Determinants of the Choice of Institutions 
(with reference to UN) 
 
 
 Parliement Government Municipalities  NGOs 
Age Young*    Young* Young** 
Gender         
Education  -* -** -**  
Material Security       
Urbanity       
**Significant at 0.01 level. 
*Significant at 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
